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We cannot, therefore, consider any member of the series under consideration as the smallest possible, but must regard the series as truly endless. We have, then, an infinite series, limited at but one point, which cannot be regarded as a sum total, a quantitative whole, equal as a whole to the given line; and the apparent exception we find to be not incompatible with the general position we have assumed.

According to the Berkeleyan theory, which would hold that the subdivision of any given portion of space will result in the simple, we are compelled to assume that the point in question passes over the line by the successive addition of simple parts; but we may still hold the mathematical series to be infinite. The negation of an infinite divisibility to space does not imply the negation of the infinity of a mathematical series, but simply implies that mathematical reasonings can be applied to the determination of space only within certain limits—those of a possible perception. We find, then, that, on either theory, this antinomy, like all the others, depends upon a misconception, and is capable of an easy solution.

FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF J. G. FICHTE BY A. E. KROEGER.

PART THIRD.—*Concerning the Higher Faculty.*

CHAPTER III.

GENERAL REVIEW OF ALL THE PRECEDING.

Life, as One, is simply because it is; and in this its Being it is altogether not an object of contemplation, but an object of thinking; and, moreover, of pure thinking, or intellectualizing.

It cannot be contemplated, for contemplation is a being of immediate freedom. But life in its pure being is not free at all to tear itself loose from that being; it is absolutely tied down to that its formal being. It is, therefore, absolutely impossible that life should have an immediate contemplation of its being.

Nevertheless, it is thinkable. It has freedom to manifest itself

in its being, and in this manifestation it certainly contemplates itself; but in none of its manifestations is it altogether absorbed. Hence its fundamental manifestation is a double one; it can rise above them and comprehend itself as that which remains unchangeable in the change. This comprehension of itself is a going beyond the contemplation, and hence, according to the above established conception, a thinking generally. But it is, furthermore, as distinct from the thinking treated of here, a *pure* thinking. For, although the going *beyond* a form of contemplation (as in the above-mentioned external perception there is a going beyond the *inner* form of contemplation) is a thinking, the entering into another form of contemplation (the external form, in the above case) is not a pure but a sensuous thinking. Here we are face to face with the original manifestation of life, and, therefore, at the source of all contemplation. We go beyond it, and hence beyond all contemplation. This thinking is, therefore, a pure thinking, or an intellectualizing.

The fundamental manifestation of life is, as I have said, a double one. This it is necessarily; for if it were merely simple, and if life were thus absorbed in it, the thinking of a something, which remained unchangeable in every change, would be impossible. Hence there must be, at least, a change of forms, a duplicity of the form. The change itself is posited by that thinkability, and is, in its fundamental element, nothing else than that thinkability. Hence duplicity suffices for it; and hence nothing more than duplicity is needed for it.

It is of a double character. First, an absolute self-alienation, a general contemplation; as yet, however, not contemplating that power as power, but merely contemplating its object, the sensuous world. Second, an absolute return into itself through concentration into one point of that general contemplation, and a consequent assumption of individual form, and self-consciousness and free activity in that form.

It is well known, but does not concern us here, that while the first fundamental form remains always unchangeably one, life can represent itself in this second fundamental form of individuality in an infinite repetition of that form. But it always remains the same one fundamental form; and this formal unity alone is at present considered by us.

In the first form life generally (*vita*) is viewed as a permanent power; a view which certainly does not immediately follow from the contemplation, but which we comprehend here as following from the general connection.

In the second view the same life is contemplated as a real living (taking the word as a verb, *vivere*), and hence as an immediate moving and being active. We therefore have in both views an immediate contemplation of the living of the life. The whole is a contemplation of life, and nothing else.

Why this contemplation of life should dirempt into a duplicity of form we have already stated; the reason given being, that it is thinkable, as it must be, only in this manner. But it cannot be thinkable without being contemplated, since it is thinkable only under the condition of being an object of contemplation, the fact of thinking being merely a going beyond contemplation, and being, therefore, conditioned by it. Adding thinking to contemplation, the whole would be a revelation of life unto itself.

It can also be shown why the contemplation of life must have separated into that duplicity of form in the exact manner in which it did so separate. In the universal form, life is contemplated only as a possible living. This is as yet no true living; and hence the second form, in which the contemplation of actual living and moving becomes possible, must supply the deficiency of content of the first. In this second form, again, life is never contemplated in its totality and in its completed being, but only in beginnings, which point to an infinite further development. Hence the first form must supply the deficiency of extent of this second contemplation. Neither of the forms of contemplation by itself, but only both in their union, furnish an expressive contemplation of life.

The whole system of facts of consciousness, therefore, which we have hitherto established, has really been deduced from one ground, and comprehended as a necessary in itself connected totality. If there is life, and if life reveals itself to itself, then there must be precisely such a consciousness as we have described; for only in this form can life reveal itself to itself.

It is well known to us that the first form results in a permanent sensuous world with all the determinations pointed out in it; and also that the second form results in a system of individuals,

with necessary determinations; but we know at the same time that the whole is nothing but the necessary form of the self-contemplation of life. We know that this contemplation necessary separates into such images, and that, indeed, it dirempts originally in order to be able alone to think itself beyond all contemplation. Hence we are far from arresting our investigation at those images, as in themselves essences.

But how did we arrive at that result? Positively in no other way than by following the purely scientific principle to regard consciousness as a phenomenon existing for itself, and to explain it out of itself. What, then, is the hitherto described consciousness? It is an exhibition of free activity, and utterance of power, merely and solely for the purpose of making power manifest and cause freedom to be visible as freedom—an exhibition which has no other end than to make the freedom appearing in it to be really freedom.

I should not be at all annoyed if any one were to consider such a consciousness a very empty and insignificant exhibition; or if he were to suspect any description of it to be not very profound and thorough, and hence to be incorrect.

But we have often before hinted already that such a view is not to be our final result. Hitherto we have regarded life merely as life, as absolute freedom and self-activity, and from this presupposition we have correctly enough arrived at all our previous conclusions.

But supposing the presupposition of our immediately preceding paragraph should prove true, and that a new law should assign to absolute freedom a definite aim and end. Supposing that freedom should no longer exist for its own sake, but as the means and instrument of this higher law, of the moral law, which is to be realized through freedom in the sphere of external contemplation, and which, therefore, must be contemplated itself! What would be the result then?

Precisely as the whole system of consciousness, hitherto deduced, was a contemplation of life, so life itself, in its just discovered spiritual unity, would become a contemplation of the moral law. It would, therefore, be contemplated no longer merely for the sake of being contemplated, and for the sake of giving rise to an exhibition of freedom. The exhibition would obtain a unity, a sig

nificance, an end: morality. We should have to say that the one life of freedom is, in truth, nothing but the form of contemplating morality. It might be that, in our investigation of this moral law, it would turn out that here also we should be driven to ask: What is it? for what purpose? and whence its origin? and that then we should discover again that the moral law is also nothing but the form of contemplating a higher principle, arriving at which, no further questions could be asked. In this way absolutely everything would change into contemplations and forms of contemplation and nothing would remain as a true Being but the One absolute principle. Everything within the region of contemplation would change into conditioned and conditioning forms of contemplation except the absolute contemplation of the One absolute principle, which alone would remain as the absolute contemplation, having its being for its own sake.

Life must be contemplated in order that the moral law may be contemplated; and the moral law must be contemplated in order that the absolute may be contemplated: this will be the ascending series of our meditations.

CHAPTER IV.

THE MORAL LAW AS THE PRINCIPLE OF LIFE, AND THE LATTER AS THE VISIBILITY OF THE FORMER.

A.

Life, it is true, is out of itself, of itself, and through itself in form—*i. e.*, in its activity. This is an immediate result of its conception, since otherwise it would not be life. But it is quite a different question whether its conceived existence, beyond all activity, is also based in itself and absolute. If this question is answered in the affirmative, then life and its manifestation, exist only for the purpose of existing, and for no other purpose.

We have already before, in the course of our investigation, met some facts of consciousness according to which this question can not be answered in the affirmative. Indeed, the natural aversion of every uncorrupted man to consider formal freedom as its own end and aim is the most general and telling fact of this kind.

We have gathered together these facts, and expressed them by the supposition that there exists some definite or final purpose,

which is to be attained by the activity of this life ; and that, consequently, life is not merely for its own sake, or for the sake of manifesting itself, but for the sake of that definite or final end ; in short, that it is merely a tool and means of realizing that end. Let us now further analyze that supposition.

If Life does not exist for its own sake, then it also does not exist *through* itself ; that is, the ground of its existence is not in itself, but in another, namely, in that final end. Life, indeed, is only *thought*, as we have seen. Now, if this thinking of life examines itself in order to discover whether it has its ground in itself or not, it most certainly finds that it cannot constitute a fact the ground of the thought life, since life is thought as in itself the ground of all facts, and the only ground of facts. If, therefore, life cannot be thought as being its own ground, a final end can and must be thought as such ground.

That final end, therefore, which also can only be thought, and which must be presupposed as existing—and for the present as, at least relatively, absolutely existing—is the ground of the formal existence of life as well as of its qualitative character. All this is involved in our presupposition.

How this final end can be thought by us as existing—for the present such a thinking is absolutely demanded, and we know that it is possible. Should any one say that such a thinking were impossible for him, we should simply have to decline his participating in our investigation ; and what an entirely different sphere of being it opens to us we shall mention afterward, and by that very means ascend higher. But, factually, within the sphere of appearances, that final end has not actual existence, but is to, *shall*, have actual existence through life. The final end is, where it is, only through life. Again : life itself, in its own existence, is only through the Being of the final end. It is evident that in these two propositions the word *is* must have a different meaning, since otherwise they would contradict and cancel each other.

The Being of life, therefore, is positively nothing absolute itself. We have discovered its ground : it is the final end which creates and determines it.

Why does the final end need to create a Life outside of itself ? Since our investigation doubtless seeks the Absolute, and since we have now discovered a higher somewhat, which, in comparison

with life, at least, is absolute—why should we now again proceed from this new discovered Absolute toward life? Does the conception of a final end itself, perhaps, involve such a going beyond itself again? Undoubtedly. It needs a somewhat of which it is the final end. It wants to be realized, and needs a means for that purpose; and this purpose it furnishes itself, so far as we can now perceive, in life.

It wants to be realized; but the real and actual can be contemplated. It is to be contemplated; and hence it needs life. Life, therefore, is, in its real essence, the contemplability or the appearance of the final end.

B.

Having obtained this new and higher view of life, it will now be our duty to further determine the hitherto final results of our investigation; and this further determination will henceforth be our business.

Firstly, the content of our previous absolute thinking was this: Life *is*. This content has now been changed into this expression: The visibility of an absolute final end *is*—which is the substantial part of the expression; and this visibility is absolutely active, pure, and altogether creative—which is its formal part. Every one will here perceive a duplicity. The absolute final end is altogether and throughout determined by itself. It is what it is simply through itself, and this is a determined Somewhat. It *is*; it does not grow to be; and nothing in it grows to be. Hence it is also beyond all life, and as the ground of the being of that life. Now, this final end assumes here, moreover, the form of an absolute life and of a freedom, which is an absolute creating out of nothingness, as we have described it heretofore.

Now, what can this life create out of nothingness? Its inner content and core, perhaps, and the inner content and core of its product? If we take up the former view, where we regarded it as purely formal life and freedom, unquestionably. But, according to the present view, which does not concede that it is an absolutely being and complete final end, in which there is no growth and becoming, we can no longer say so. Hence it could create only the form; that is, it creates the final end, which was previously merely in the spiritual and altogether invisible world, in the visible world, wherein that final end did not previously

have existence. It is, therefore, an absolute creator, but only of the form, and not of the content, of the final end. It no more creates the latter than it is created by it.

We furthermore came across the basis of all contemplation—namely: the utterance, or manifestation, of that life. And this we met in a double form: the universal form, which represents the one total life in its mere possibility; and the individual form, which represents it as actually active, but only from out of specific points. The duplicity of that form was necessary in order to make life something more than merely thinkable. The contemplation was contemplation of the life just as it is, as a mere free activity and nothing else. But at present we perceive that life is not to be contemplated merely for the sake of being contemplated, but in order that the final end may be contemplated in life. Previously we deduced contemplation from the conception of the contemplability of mere life. This, now, is no longer sufficient. Life is to be contemplated as at the same time the means and the tool of the final end. Thus the contemplability of the final end itself must enter through life at the same time in our *a priori* determination of the general system of contemplation. By means of this fundamental law we must now further determine the determination of contemplation so far as we have discovered it at present; and to do so will be our business now.

C.

The duplicity of the fundamental form was the condition of the thinkability of life; but this thinking itself is again, as has appeared in the course of our investigation, a condition of the thinkability of the final end, and hence of its appearance in the form of thinking. Hence this disjunction remains, as well in regard to the contemplability of the final end as of that of life. Presupposing it to be valid, we have, therefore, to determine only its two single fundamental forms.

I. The General Form. This is, firstly, contemplation of the Power of Life, which comprises an infinite manifold. Now, what must be, according to our previous view, the determining ground of this manifold—that is to say, as a manifold in its seeming inner content, in so far as this is a particular content? The activity, in its pure unity, is not contemplable, but only thinkable; if it

is to become contemplatable, it must dirempt itself; and, since it is to be infinitely contemplatable, it must dirempt itself infinitely. The ground of the seeming diversity of the particular is, therefore, contained altogether in the absolute contemplatability; and this is diverse, because otherwise it would not exist at all; but the true basis is the mere empty freedom, wherein there is nothing distinguishable. Thus, then, the manifoldness is a mere semblance; an appearance simply in order to be an appearance; and it is nothing else.

According to our present view, the Power exists not only in order to cause the appearance of activity, but also in order that it may appear as the tool of the final end. Through the command of this final end the free activity is limited, within general possibility, to a fixed sphere. Not all that is possible, but only a part of the possible, is to occur. Now let us ask: Does this part, which is to occur, occur merely for the sake of making freedom visible? By no means; but in order to make the final end visible. This final end, taken as real, would be this part of the power—of the real power, or of the power of the real. Now, how is that, which is not to occur, related to it? This opens to us a double view: the final end is to be made visible through life, and hence through freedom. But freedom in the individual form, which alone admits of acting, comprises self-limitation. Hence, the visibility of a command of a final end involves expressly that there shall be a play-ground, as it were, or a more extended sphere, wherein something prohibited can be found. So much, for the present, concerning the matter of the visibility of the command; its formal part we shall meet in proper time.

Hence, the visibility of the final end most certainly involves that, besides the sphere of the acts commanded, there shall also be another sphere of mere possibility; but the final end can involve no determination as to what are to be the contents of this other sphere, since it is fully exhausted by the sphere of the commanded. Thus that inner sphere of mere possibility falls under the rule of the above determining law—the law of the contemplatability of purely empty and nugatory freedom. All this is no power to create the Real, but merely the power to create an Appearance.

From this it follows, firstly, that it is possible to represent the final end through the means of life; that freedom can absolutely

do whatever it is bid to do, and that there is no possibility of a dispute about these matters. The original power of life is nothing else than the power to achieve the final end; nothing else than the original self-manifestation of this final end in freedom. The totality of the power expresses the final end wholly and completely; nay, it comprises far more; that is, also, the power not to obey; and the other expression of the final end comprises only the narrower sphere.

Let me add this: We know, from our investigation, that the general contemplation must be described as a contemplation of power; in immediate contemplation, we behold only the object of that power—nature. Now, just as life has thus lost its independence and absoluteness, so nature, the mere image of that life, also, and to a still greater degree, loses its independence and absoluteness by that result. Just as the power is in all its determinations only the product of the final end, so nature, the mere contemplability of that power, is such a product to a still greater degree. Nature is the image of our real power, and hence absolutely conformable to an end; we can achieve in and upon nature all that the final end commands us to achieve. The principle of nature is absolutely a moral principle, and by no means a natural principle; for, if it were the latter, nature would be absolute. Nature is heteronomous, and by no means autonomous. Nature is to be explained, partly from its ends, and partly from the visibility of those ends; from both, indeed, as we have shown in the case of the power, whose image nature is. If we forget the latter point, we shall fall into absurdities.

Morality, therefore, appears here as the absolute determining principle of nature. Nor ought this to surprise us, since it has appeared as the principle of life, which again is the principle of nature.

II. In the general unity form of life, as such, we discovered not only a contemplation, but also a real power—namely, the power to concentrate into a unity-point of the general power, and to create individual forms by that contraction.

Now, since life, in its truly real acting, is, without exception, the expression of the final end, the same applies to those *actibus individuationis*. Our previous assumption, that life were herein utterly free and lawless, now drops entirely to the ground. Life, in

this production of individual forms, is determined altogether by the final end. Each individual, therefore, who comes into existence does so come into existence through the final end, and solely for the sake of the final end. Nevertheless, he comes into existence as an individual; that is, just as individuation appeared formerly as the concentration into a unity-point of a possibility of acting, and a connection of a fixed series of possibilities of acting from this unity-point, so now it appears as the concentration to a unity-point of the *Shall*, and as the connection of a series of *Shalls* from this unity-point. Just as above the general sphere of a power of doing separated into several individual faculties, so here the general problem given to the one life separates into several problems; into parts, through the realization of all of which, if it were at all possible in time, the universal final end would be realized, each individual having, through his mere existence within the sphere of universal life, such a specific problem. Each one is to do that which he alone is called to do (or *shall* do), and which he alone *can* do—since the concentration upon the unity-point of the *Shall* is also a concentration upon the unity-point of the *Can*—which only he, and positively no one else, is called to do and can do, and which, if *he* does not do it, will be done by no one else, at least of this community of individuals. Precisely as we discovered above, that in a physical aspect the individual comes into existence without any action or consciousness of his own, and cannot change this his Being—this concentration upon or into a unity-point—although having the power to determine himself from that point with absolute freedom, so now, in the world of his moral destination, he is to find himself as he is, without any action or consciousness of his own, and without any power to change this his moral being. But neither must (shall) he, in this his moral world, even desire to change it, but must further voluntarily develop and determine himself in accordance with that found fundamental law of his moral determination. The individual does not assign to himself his moral task, for that is assigned to him simultaneously with his existence; but he does, at some time of his life, assign it to himself *consciously*. This, however, he can do only because it has been originally assigned to him, without his consciousness, through his mere existence. The coming into existence of an individual is a particular and altogether determined

decree of the moral law in general, which expresses itself in full only by its decrees to *all* individuals.

The one and universal life, in its assumption of individual form, is altogether determined through the final end. In what manner? It is true that life is activity, and, moreover, absolute, creative activity. But in this, its universal form, it is not conscious of itself, and hence it is not free in the strict sense of the word. That is to say, there is no impulse in it which it may follow or not follow. Hence, it is not determined through the final end, as the individual is determined through the command of the final end, with a freedom to obey or disobey. The final end operates upon life in its universal form as a law of nature, and life in this form is only the appearance in nature of the final end. In and through it such and such individuals must result, and they do result.

In this way, therefore, we have been led to a fixed and real nature, which, in so far as we ascribe reality to the final end alone, is not merely the visibility of another, but visibility for itself. What is this nature, firstly, in regard to its form? Not a substrate, or anything of that kind, but pure and absolute life and power, which creates the merely possible into an actual, the immediate fundamental principle of all actuality. The ground of its being, as well as the ground which irresistibly and, like a law of nature, determines the manifestation of its power, is the final end itself. Here we find the absolute union and the true connecting link of both worlds, the visible and the invisible.

Now, which are those original determinations, and the absolute creatures of nature? The world of individuals. The individuals, therefore, in consequence of their moral destinations, are the only true and actual in nature, and their creation completes nature in general.

Whatsoever exists otherwise, or appears as existing, is product of the particular life, or of particular life in individual form; as, for instance, contemplation of nature in the individual itself as also a part of nature, a further modification of nature, since in its unity-point it is a power of nature.

This removes all difficulties—which beset other systems, that assume an in itself absolute, hence immoral, nature—of explaining freedom and consciousness in the individual. The individual is

simply moral; and this morality posits absolutely consciousness and freedom, since morality is possible only on condition of *their* existence.

We add here the following: In the individual form, as such, the real power of life to create individuals is completed and exhausted. The individual, when once he exists, is absolutely an individual, and can neither annihilate himself nor change into other individuals, and thus create individuals outside of himself. If, therefore, universal life were to come to an end in the production of one or a certain fixed number of individuals, this coming to an end would exhaust and annihilate the real power of the one life, and life in its universal creative power would become invisible. This can never occur, for life must absolutely appear in its totality, because the final end must become visible in it. Hence, within the sphere of appearances, the world of individuals is never completed; new ones must always arise; and it is not only necessary that there should be many individuals—which we had not proved before—but that there should be a continuous, increasing, and, in the appearance, never-to-be-completed series of individuals.

We might say that, according to the above, the final end in its totality must be divided among the sum of individuals, and that hence, if the final end is a determined and complete Whole, the sum of individuals must also be a complete Whole; and this remark furnishes us opportunity for an additional statement, which opens a wide prospect. For, in so far as the final end is to become *visible*, it must be apportioned among a determined and fixed sum of individuals, since it is visible only in the form of individuals. And thus the just now demonstrated continuous creation of new moral individuals presupposes that a part of the final end is still invisible; namely, the part which is to be made visible by the new creation. In this regard, therefore, the appearance of every new-world citizen—and there is no other world than the moral world—is a revelation of the moral final end from a new and previously altogether invisible point of view. It is possible that this progressiveness of the manifestation of the final end may be conditioned by the fulfilment of the problem, which became visible previously; and that, until such fulfilment takes place, time will pass on void and empty, merely repeating the unfulfilled problem in other individuals. Thus, in the moral order of the final end,

one age of the world would be conditioned by another age, and the sequence of ages would be the gradual unfolding to greater clearness of the final end.

D.

Let us now proceed to determine the second fundamental form of the manifestation of life—the individual form—by applying the same principle.

I. The contemplation of the one and universal power exists in the individuals as such. The totality of the power, or nature, is contemplated through them as the focus of knowledge; and by each of them, of course, in the same manner, for in regard to the contents of that contemplation they are not individual, but are the one and universal life itself.

In order to remove all occasion for misapprehension or confusion, I will here add the following: The one universal life—or nature—has already, on a previous occasion, been separated into two main views: firstly, as real life, in its creation of individuals; and, secondly, as ideal life, in its self-contemplation. It can assume the latter form, as factical, only in the form of the individual, since it contemplates itself and becomes conscious of itself only in that form—though as one contemplation, and hence, as in all individual forms, the same one content. This contemplation must comprise all that is comprised in actuality. But actuality extends as far as individuation. Hence universal contemplation must comprise the contemplation of as many individuals as the one life has created; and the *immediate* universal contemplation must extend just so far: namely, to the universal contemplation of all individuals from the standpoint of every single individual.

And here let me make a remark, which I trust will remove many a misapprehension of previous propositions of the Science of Knowledge. No individual contemplates, or beholds, beings of his own kind *in himself* and in his self-contemplation, but in the immediate contemplation of the one life. Whatsoever else there is in nature—physical force, etc., down to coarse matter—is contemplated, of course, by each individual in himself, in the immediate contemplation of his universal power. But precisely because this is its universal and not its particularly limited power, it is compelled to transfer this contemplation to other

beings of its own kind, which have already appeared to it in the first contemplation.

Now, the one life, as nature, is absolutely determined by the final end in the production of individuals. It can produce no individuals, except with specific moral determinations. This, as an absolute determination of that life, must also appear in the universal contemplation thereof, and, moreover, in its immediate contemplation, wherein the individuals appear according to their existence, altogether independent of the reflection of the contemplating individual upon his own morality. It must appear in the same universality which it has in the one life. What is this universality, and where is its limit? It is this: that all individuals, without an exception, have a special moral destination of their own; and whatever this destination is for every particular individual, lies beyond the limit. The universal contemplation merely shows that all individuals have a moral destination, for the sake of which their being, and the products of their freedom, must not be treated like things of nature, but must be respected; in short, this contemplation involves all that we have previously established factually as the source of the conception of the relation of free beings to each other—the conception of Law. These conceptions we have found—and this is an important matter—to be independent of the morality of the individual himself who entertains them; nay, independent even of the fact of the reflection concerning his own morality. They are the real mediating and connecting link between the natural and the moral conceptions, as well as of their ground—the determination of the one life through the final end. The real central link is found between the two worlds.

This appears also in actual life. Even the man, who is himself unjust, and who cannot look upon his act in the form of that contemplation, being moved by passionate desire, will judge that act to be unjust when committed by another, because he is then calm and open to the impressions of his spiritual nature; just as we often find the very men demand most of others who are least inclined to help those others when necessary. In their lowest form we find these conceptions, not so much as things, which anybody is to *do*, as something, which ought to *be*.

We here obtain, therefore, a new determination of universal contemplation, the basis of the Legal Conception, whereby free-

dom is turned into nature, as it were, and called upon to operate and produce a fixed and permanent Being like an irresistible and compulsory law of nature.

II. The particular, moral determination of each individual, which is *his* in consequence of his origination from out the universal life, does not arise into consciousness in the described universal contemplation, but only in the separate and altogether internal self-contemplation of the individual as such, since this determination is his exclusively own Being. The question is, How and in what manner?

In order to answer this question thoroughly and clearly, let us investigate more closely the condition of moral freedom and its contemplability. We saw above that the mere sensuous individuality, even without any appearance of the moral law in consciousness, makes actual acting completely possible, and real freedom, the possibility of determining one's self, to do a specific act, in every way perfectible. If the moral law is added, there arises a limitation of that determined possibility; at first, of course, merely in the conception. It is conceived that the possible freedom of acting must be limited to a determined, limited sphere. Now, in consequence of this conception, the free individual, confined to the described condition, is to limit himself by a free act, and this free act is to be visible as such, since the law, as determining the life, is to be visible. But the free act, according to a previously demonstrated proposition, is visible only when a resistance occurs; hence the visibility of the moral determination as such posits, first of all, a resistance. The resistance must, therefore, be manifested—just as the visibility manifests itself—absolutely. And since it is the one life, as nature, which is determined by the formal visibility of the moral law, it must be that one life which produces such a resistance.

But, again, where must this resistance appear? Evidently in physical freedom itself, for it is this freedom which is to be determined, and, moreover, in its individual form, since here we speak only of this kind of form. This resistance is not itself an acting. For freedom is to be limited in advance of this acting. Hence, it must be necessarily a principle, which, without the moral limitation, would be an acting. In other words, it must be an impulse, for by that word we have characterized such a principle before. It must be, moreover, a positive impulse, and by no

means a mere indifference to act without any moral determination; an impulse which, in resisting this determination, must be overcome by it, and in the very overcoming of which the moral free deed must become visible. It is a necessary consequence of individuation that such an impulse should appear in the individual; for it belongs to the individual form, as a form wherein the actual causality of the moral law is to become visible.

It is a positive impulse to act, for the present, *without* any moral law. But for that very reason it aspires to perfect its whole form, and thus to be absolute, even though it be against the moral law. It wants to abrogate the moral law altogether. In our consciousness it will thus appear as a natural *will*, given to us through our mere sensuous existence. Hence the law, against which it rebels, and which, on its account, rebels against it, as a *shall*, as the negation of the will in its function, as a ground of determination. Hence this peculiar form of the law, which for that very reason is valid also only for this opposition. In determining the one life, the final end has not at all the form of the *shall*, but only the form of the *must*. It rules as a law of nature. The impulse itself is its product in so far as it is a law of nature, and exists only for the sake of its visibility and in its mere form; the same impulse which, through the same law, as a determining law of freedom, is to be annihilated, not so far as its being is concerned, which would be a contradiction, but as a determining ground of acting.

REMARK.

This impulse is a natural impulse, and, if we follow it, it produces an acting according to the law of nature. Hence, in following the impulse, the individual is not at all free, but subservient to an irrevocable law; and in this region life, in its mere form as pure life, has no causality whatever.

But what, then, is the content of this acting in general, and generally, of the manyfold in its seeming manifestation of freedom? We have seen it before: the mere contemplability of life as such, without any real core; a mere picturing in order to be a picturing; a Nothing, forever to be further formed. The individual who acts in obedience to the impulse acts under the law of this further evolution of the Nothing.

Again, if, on the other hand, the individual determines himself

through the moral law, he also is not free, and life again has no causality; for this is what freedom means. Has he, then, no freedom at all? Yes, certainly: in the transition, in rising from the condition of nature to that of morality.

This enables us to offer a ready reply to the question propounded. Consciousness is the freedom of a Being; determined consciousness, freedom of a determined being. Whatsoever is to be the immediate consciousness of a subject must be immediately the actual being of that same subject. If the subject is absorbed by the natural impulse, his moral determinedness still remains, of course; his being; but only in the background, as it were. His immediate, actual being, is that impulse. Hence the impulse alone is manifested in consciousness, and it is absolutely impossible that the moral determinedness should manifest itself in consciousness—at least so far as its *contents* are concerned; for, in regard to the *form*, and in so far as that form is contained in the general conception of law, as a part of the universal contemplation, it may be otherwise. Now, what is the ground of this impossibility? The absorption by the impulse. Hence the individual must, first of all, get rid of the impulse. Can he do this? Or, in order to give another form to the question: Since such a self-ridding of the law of nature on the part of the individual, without having determined himself as yet by the moral law, would be the just described freedom, the causality of the life through itself, is the individual really and in point of fact free?

Since such a freedom conditions the determinability through the moral law, and hence its absolute visibility, does not this actual and real freedom belong to the absolute determinations of the individual, as such, which it receives immediately from nature under the determination of the final end?

Three things, therefore, constitute the essence of the individual: 1. The natural impulse; 2. The moral determination or destination; and 3. Absolute freedom as the mediating link between the two former.

Hence the individual must annihilate the impulse, as its immediately actual being, through this freedom. Does any Being, then, still adhere to it? Of course; that is, its moral destination; and this is now its immediate, actual Being. For the present, how-

ever, it is still free in regard to it, since it has not yet determined itself in accordance with the laws of that destination. Hence it now enters the emptied consciousness necessarily, in consequence of the law of consciousness.

Now, what sort of a consciousness is this? As the immediate expression of Being, it is necessarily an immediate contemplation, which forms itself under this condition precisely as it is, without any freedom on the part of the knowing—such as we meet in thinking, which is a going beyond contemplation—and accompanied, as all contemplation is, by immediate evidence. Its content has no external ground, and cannot be made a subject of argument, like a series of thinking. It simply is, and is what it is; that is, it is a consciousness that I am called upon to do this very particular thing.

Result.—The determinateness of moral consciousness is not produced by the freedom of thinking, but absolutely creates itself. It is true that freedom co-operates in the process, but somewhat differently. By killing the impulse, it puts itself into the condition wherein it can realize itself that determined contemplation propounds a problem, which the individual can freely make his own, and which he ought to and most certainly, according to the above, can solve. But the acting of the individual is an infinite line, and, by virtue of that infinity, stands under the moral law. Hence, after accomplishing the first problem, a second problem will arise for the individual—conditioned by the first one—and so on *ad infinitum*. The moral destination of the individual, which is altogether completed by his going beyond universal life, as a Being, can thus arise to consciousness only in an infinite, never-to-be-finished series of separate, determined contemplations, which series is connected and remains the same through the law of conditionedness; and the determined act, we are called upon and actually can do, is valid only for the determined time-moment.

The impulse, as an essential component part of the individual, remains eternal; hence freedom also remains eternal. If, therefore, the individual had determined himself to realize his determined moral problem, he nevertheless would be able to repeal, or cancel, this his moral task at any time; or, even if he did undertake the next task, he still might refuse obedience to the following, etc., etc. In this condition his infinite life would therefore re-

main an everlasting self-determination, a continuous creation of free resolves, which, however, might just as well be moral as immoral. But in that case the moral law would also not be a determinedness of *Being*, of the fixed, unchangeable unit of individual life, as it proposes to be; but it would exist merely accidentally, and as a determining ground of some manifestations of life without any rule or law whatever.

These accidental manifestations would be moral, to be sure, but the life itself, in its root and basis, would remain immoral.

That accomplished problem was in contemplation; hence life must be determined by contemplation. But it is to be determined by the absolutely invisible and eternal unity of the law. How can this determination, as the only true morality of the individual, manifest itself?

Evidently only by the absolute annihilation and canceling of the impulse as well as of freedom, since the described opposite condition is founded on the latter. Now, neither of them can be annihilated as faculties. They must, therefore, be annihilated as facts. The individual must have the power to determine himself for all eternity never to admit any more as a fact the freedom which nevertheless continues as a possibility forever.

Determination through freedom is called a *free* Willing—not the previously described *natural* Willing. That determination would, therefore, be a resolve henceforth and forever to obey—without flinching or considering, and without any separate resolve of freedom—the moral law, in whatever form it may present itself in our infinite contemplation.

Of course, freedom would remain as a faculty—a possibility; and hence such a will—for in its continuance we must call it will, and not, as in the moment of its origination, resolve—must uphold itself eternally through itself, which upholding is precisely the continuous annihilation of the always possible real freedom, and will manifest itself as such an upholding. But continuous self-determination, to be moral, is now no longer possible, since this self-determination has been achieved for all eternity. Now let the moral law develop itself internally hereafter in the infinitely continued series of contemplations, and you may be sure that its eternal life will develop itself precisely in the same manner, since the Will, as the mediating agency, is always present.

The act of the creation of an eternal and holy Will in itself is the act by which the individual creates itself into being, the immediate visibility of the final end, and by which it, therefore, completes its own peculiar internal life. Henceforth the individual no longer lives himself, but within him lives, as ought to live, the final end. The final end, I say, and not the command (Categorical Imperative), for only in relation to the impulse and freedom is the final end a *Shall* and a Command; not for the Will, since the will wills nothing but the final end, and is, in truth, the Will of that final end. If we therefore still choose to look upon that final end as a law, it must be as actually through the mediating Will, a law of nature for real life, since a law of nature can now, that we have presupposed the existence of the Will, be nothing else than a manifestation of the final end. After the annihilation of freedom, even individual life changes into nature, *i. e.*, the higher and supersensuous nature.

E.

Determination of the Universal and Individual Forms in their Union through the Final End.

I. The determination through the final end involves immediately, not the universal operating power of life, or the sensuous world, but only the sum of free individuals. It involves that power of life only in form; that is, in so far as there must be generally a play-ground, or a larger sphere, wherein to make visible moral freedom in its distinction from natural freedom.

But the final end itself marks out within that absolutely given sphere a narrower field—the field of the productions of morality—and this field is divided off among the several individuals. Now, whatever we may think in regard to that general world as to its infinity or finity, this, at least, is immediately clear: the moral problem within it, describing, as it does, a narrower circle, must be a finite problem, which can be realized, and will be realized at some time by the totality of all the individuals to whom the problem is allotted. But, whenever this problem is realized, the reason for the existence of the sensuous world, which reason alone keeps it in existence, disappears, and hence the sensuous world itself vanishes.

II. But in so far as the final end itself is not, as here, an accidental manifestation, but determined in its absolute Being, it is necessarily infinite, just as life itself is, in this respect, infinite. Hence, after the annihilation of this first world, it must produce through life itself as nature—*i. e.*, as universal and eternal nature—a second world, altogether in the same form, in which alone it can become visible; that is, in individuals with natural impulses, freedom, and moral determination.

Of this second world we would have to say the same that we said of the first world; namely: the problem assigned to it will be solved at some time; and thus the second world also will perish. But, in order to represent the infinity of the final end, the same absolute and fundamental law will necessitate the creation of a third world, etc., etc., *ad infinitum*. The final end can make itself visible in life only as an infinite series of consecutive worlds.

III. Nevertheless, there is in this infinite consecutiveness of worlds only one life and only one determining final end. But how does it remain a unity and connected, and how does it thus become visible as a unity? The product of the absolute immediate determination of life through the final end we have in the individuals. It is only within the individuals, and through the self-contemplation of their power, that sensuous worlds arise. Those individuals are created through life as absolutely one and the same eternal nature, and the sensuous worlds are created only by the transit through the principle of the visibility of life. Hence, the individuals, being produced by the final itself, and not by any special manifestation thereof, remain the same. Their individual unity extends beyond the infinite series of all worlds; of course, in so far as they have determined their existence in actuality by the final end, or in so far as they have engendered the *will* in themselves. By means of this will, which is the immediate Being of the final end in them, and which creates worlds only for them and for their eternal end, they survive the destruction of all worlds. For the real and last appearance of the final end occurs only in the form of the individual, and the will alone is the proper medium of this appearance, the worlds being merely the spheres for the visibility of the individual wills. Those individuals who have not engendered that will in themselves will discontinue to exist.

They are mere appearances in this first world, according to the laws thereof, and perish along with that world.

Hence, the unity of life reposes for all eternity in the unity of the self-consciousness of the individuals, which began in this world, and in the unity of its contemplations of all its worlds, which, on that account, must also remain connected.

IV. This is the fundamental unity. But how does it connect the different worlds and make their series appear as one series? The answer is ready at hand: In regard to its existence, every preceding series is the condition of the possibility of the following series. Life can progress only by means of its complete development from the first step to the second step, etc., etc. In regard to the internal connection, the ideal ground, the determination through the final end, each preceding step exists simply because the next step is to follow it. The second step, for instance, is the expression of the final end, determined in its particular way, because the final end is determined in its particular way; but this second step cannot be taken until the first step, as the means and condition of that expression, has been taken.

Now, what, then, is that world which is to exist absolutely, and which, therefore, is the absolute expression of the final end, and after the realization of which the final end will have been altogether achieved and made visible? Evidently that world which exists for its own sake, and not for the sake of another world. Hence the last or final world. But there is no such final world, seeing that the series is infinite. Hence the absolute final end itself never becomes visible; only conditions of it become everlastingly visible. We can, therefore, never achieve the final end in its absolute contents, and must abandon our endeavor to reach in this series an absolute, which will become visible as such.

REMARKS AND DEDUCTIONS.

1. The second world, and, to a still higher degree, the infinite series of subsequent worlds, give admittance only to those individuals who have in the first world cut themselves off from immoral nature and engendered a holy will within themselves. Whatsoever remains in this life a mere manifestation of nature, perishes with that nature. But as no individuals, even not the perishing ones, are without a moral destination, and as the moral

end of this world must be realized in its totality, nature, being governed by the determination of the final end, is bound to create other individuals in place of those who do not realize their destination, and to give to those new individuals the same task which the perished failed to achieve.

2. Only those individuals, in whom the will has become a fixed and unchangeable Being, progress into future worlds. Now, although the will will have to exert and uphold itself forever also in those future worlds, since in those worlds also freedom and impulse must continue to exist as their absolutely formal conditions, it nevertheless may be assumed that individuals, once admitted into that series of future worlds, will be able to uphold their will. Hence no further perishing of individuals is possible in those worlds, though the worlds themselves will perish after the lapse of their time, and bring forth new worlds.

3. Hence in those future worlds we shall always have tasks and labors as we have here; but we shall always have a holy and good will; never a sensuous will.

Let me add the following general remarks: All individual life is, at its beginning, immoral, not in regard to its destination and what it ought to achieve, but in actuality. Morality is the product simply of absolute freedom. No individual is engendered a moral being, but each must make himself a moral being.

Again: The sphere for this self making itself moral on the part of life is the present world; it is the place for the culture of the will for all future worlds. Hence our present world is absolutely the first of the whole series of worlds; and neither it, nor the individuals appearing on it, have ever existed before.

And, finally, in all the future worlds there will appear only old individuals, who have existed previously in this present world of ours, and in it have arisen to a holy will. Hence no future world will produce new individuals. (Not to mention that, being new individuals, they would necessarily be immoral.)

It is true that we have previously established the proposition that the one life must become visible in its unity as life; that is, as causality, and that thus we have proved that life must produce individuals, at least in its primary determination. Now, has this our proposition—deduced, as it is, from the eternal law of visibility—validity for all eternity? And if it has, must not the one life in

its causality become visible as a Unit in all future worlds? Unquestionably. But in that case it has made itself visible as the factual principle of the production of a new world, and, accordingly, of infinite new future worlds, in which character it is not at all visible here.

ROWLAND G. HAZARD'S WORKS.¹

In previous numbers of this journal we have quoted largely from the latest work of Dr. Hazard. To the Anglo-Saxon mind the question of self-determination, so important to the philosopher, takes the form of the possibility of the freedom of the will. That the ordinary reflection—the second stage of knowing, as we have called it in another place²—will be sure to deny the possibility of freedom in a given instance, we may be certain. This is certain, because it does not acknowledge the existence of freedom as a possibility in any shape, and, of course, it will not recognize any special example of the same. Give it the idea of Cause, and, though it will admit that one object is modified through another, and that the modified object is effect, it will refuse to think the cause as a first cause of motion, but will hold: “A given cause is made active by some other cause.” It thus avoids the issue of the problem, and declines to

¹ 1. “*Essay on Language, and other Papers.*” By Rowland G. Hazard. Edited by E. P. Peabody. Boston: Phillips, Sampson & Co. 1857.

2. “*Our Resources.*” New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1868.

3. “*Finance and Hours of Labor.*” New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1868.

4. “*Freedom of Mind in Willing; or, Every Being that wills, a Creative First Cause.*” New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1864.

5. “*Two Letters, on Causation, and Freedom in Willing, addressed to John Stuart Mill. With an Appendix on the Existence of Matter, and our Notions of Infinite Space.*” By Rowland G. Hazard. Boston: Lee & Shepard. 1869.

6. “*Zwei Briefe ueber Verursachung und Freiheit im Willen.*” Gerichtet an John Stuart Mill. Mit einem Anhang ueber die Existence des Stoffes und unsere Begriffe des Unendlichen Raumes. Von Rowland G. Hazard. New York: B. Westermann & Co. Leipzig: Bernhard Hermann.

7. “*Animals not Automata.*” By Rowland G. Hazard, Esq. (Reprint from “*The Popular Science Monthly*,” vol. vi, p. 405.)

8. “*Man a Creative First Cause.*” Two Discourses delivered at Concord, Mass., July, 1882. By Rowland G. Hazard, LL. D. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1883.

² See October ('83) number “*Jour. Spec. Phil.*” “*Philosophy in Outline*,” Chapter ix, § 82.